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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Case No. 18,076 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The State Division of Registration has not issued 
licenses under The Massage Practice Act because the Legislature 
failed to provide any means to establish a Board which can give 
the required examinations. The Division maintains that the 
legislature must amend the statute in order to implement the 
licensing provisions. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Both parties moved for Summary Judgment, with the 
District Court granting the Division's Motion on the grounds 
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that U.C.A. 58-47-1 et seq is not implementable and that the 
internal problems were such that it would take legislative, 
not judicial action to correct. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmation of the lower court's 
ruling requiring the Utah Legislature to make the necessary 
changes so that the act can be implemented. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The 1981 Utah State Legislature enacted Senate Bill 
267, The Massage Practice Act (hereinafter referred to as 
Act). Since that time the "Act" has been codified as 
Sections 58-47-1 et seg, Utah Code Annotated (1981 
Supplement). The Act created a statutory scheme for the 
licensure of masseurs practicing within the state. As part 
of the licensure system the Act provided for the 
establishment of the Utah Board of Massage (hereinafter 
referred to as Board). Among other things, the Board is to 
oversee the licensure of "massage technicians." The initial 
exam is to be given by and under the dire~tion of the Board. 
Prior to the passage of the Act there wer·e- no licensed 
masseurs under the Act or any other state Act in the State 
of Utah. 
When the Director of the State Division of Registration 
(hereinafter referred to as Director) attempted to create 
the Board, he was faced with an impossible situation. Sec-
tion 58-4-73, U.C. A.(1981 Supp.) states that the Board is to 
2 
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be created pursuant to the requirements of Chapter 1 of 
Title 58, U.C.A. Under the instructions provided the Direc-
tor of the Department in Section 58-1-6, U.C.A. (1981 Supp.), 
the Board is to be comprised of 5 members. Of the 5 members, 
4 are to be licensed massage tec~icians and one from the 
general public. Since the Board is to prepare, oversee and 
direct the examinations required for becoming massage tech-
nicians, and further, since there are presently no massage 
technicians who are licensed, there is no way the Department 
can appoint a Boardo The Director has no choice but to fol-
low the statutese In the absence of qualified licensed mas-
seurs, it is simply impossible to establish_ the Board and to 
license anyone under the Act. 
When the Director failed to implement the licensing pro-
visions, plaintiffs initiated this action in district court 
seeking a declaratory judgment requiring the creation of the 
Board. Defendants countered by asking for summary judgment, 
there being no disputed facts. The motions.of both parties 
came on for hearing before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor in 
September of 198le After hearing oral arguments from both 
parties, Judge Taylor issued an order finding that the Court 
could not make the necessary changes in the wording of the 
statute, "that matter being one of legislative jurisdiction." 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE IS CLEAR AND 
UNAMBIGUOUS. THERE IS NO NEED TO RESORT 
TO THE PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. 
It has long been the established policy of this court to 
refrain from the use of statutory construction when the language 
used in a disputed statute is clear and unambiguous. This 
principle was emphasized in the case of State v. Archuletta, 
526 P.2d 911 (Utah, 1974), where the court stated: 
"The intention of the legislature is to be 
collected from the words they-employ. Where there 
is no ambiguity in the words,,·there is no room for 
construction." [citing United States v. Wiltberger, 
5 Wheat 76, 95, 5 L. Ed. 37 (1920) (at 912)] 
There is no ambiguity in the words of the sections 
of the Act which created the Board. The meaning of the 
statute is clear, precise and subject to only one interpre-
tation. Section 58-47-3, U.C.A. (1981 Supp.) indicates that 
the Board is to be established pursuant to guidelines found 
in Section 58-1-6, U.C.A. (1981 Supp.). Therefore, the Board 
should have five members, four licensed massage technicians 
and one member of the general public .. Section 58-47-8, U.C.A., 
(1981 Supp.) indiates that in order to become a licensed mas-
sage technician, one must be examined. The exam is to be 
given by and under the direction of the Board. Because 
there are no licensed massage technicians, the Board cannot 
be created. There is no ambiguity in the Act. The result 
is clear and precise. Absent licensed technicians, the Divi-
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sion cannot empanel the Board. The examination is not waived 
for anyoneo Only the educational requirements are waived for 
those individuals who have been practicing for five years 
or longero The statute requires the examination to be admin-
istered by the Board. Since no Board of Licensed Masseurs 
can be established, the legislature must modify the language 
to so allow a Board to be established to oversee licensing 
matters before any licenses can be issuedo 
Appellants present an excellent discussion of the power 
of the courts to amend, add or omit words to the language of 
ambiguous statutes. Relying heavily on cases from other 
jurisdictions, it is contended that if the L\ct is strictly 
followed, it will lead to an absurd result or one at variance 
with the intent of the legislature as a whole. It is the 
result which Appellants maintain creates the ambiguity 
in the statute. Unusual results, as here, are not per se -
ambiguous. And as here, there is no ambiguity. Clear lan-
guage creates a result that is hard to comprehend. If that 
is not what the Utah Legislature intended, then that body 
should make the necessary changes to obtain the correct 
result. 
However, the cases cited by the Appellants are 
easily distinguished from the facts of the case now before 
the court. In each case, the courts were faced with ambigu-
ities which existed in the langauge of the statutes themselves. 
Rather than distinguish each case cited by Appellants, one 
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case will illustrate the differences which exist between the 
case now before this Court and those cases cited by Appellants. 
In State v. Rawson, 312 P.2d 849 (Or. 1957) the Oregon Supreme 
court was faced with determining which state agency controlled 
the mineral rights to land upon which volcanic ash was to be 
harvested. Identifying the issue of the case the court stated: 
"The whole case depends upon whether the 
statute authorizing a lease by the land board 
applies to the property in question." 
The Court continued, saying: 
"It is apparent that the same land cannot be 
at the same time subject to the complete or exclu-
sive control of two separate -state agencies, nor 
can the funds expended and proceeds received come 
from or be placed in two mutually exclusive funds." 
The issue in Rawson is completely .different from the 
issue now before the court. There is no question as to whom 
the Act applies. There are no sections of the Act which are 
in conflict with each other. Masseurs can only be licensed by 
one board. No statute gives any other agency, commission or 
board the authority vested in the Board. Not only are the 
words clear and unambiguous, but the application of the Act 
is free from contradiction. Absent such: ,._ambiguity there is no 
room for construction. Every jurisdiction cited by Appellants 
embraces this doctrine. The Oregon Court in Monaco v. United 
States Fidelity &·Guaranty Co., 550 P. 2d 422 (Or. 1976) 
stated: 
"Whatever the legislative history of an act may 
indicate, it is for the legislature to translate 
its intent into operational language. This 
6 
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court cannot correct clear and·unambiguous 
language for the legislature so as to better 
serve what the court feels was or should have 
been the legislature's intent." [citing Lane 
County v. Hewtz Construction Co. et al, 228 Or. 
152, 364 P. 2d 627 (1961); emphasis added] 
The Supreme Court of North Dakota, in the case of Rausch v. 
Nelson, 134 N.W. 2d 519, 525 (ND} 1965) indicated that: 
"Where the language of a statute is plain 
and unambiguous, the court can not indulge in 
speculation as to probable or possible qual-
ifications which might have been in the mind of 
the legislature, but the statute must be given 
effect according to its plain and obvious mean-
ing, and cannot be extended beyond it." [citing 
59 C.J. pp. 955-957; city of Dickinson v. Thress, 
69 N.D. 748, 290 N.W. 653 at 652] 
It is contended by the Appellants that_because it is 
impossible to set up the Board, following a strict interpre-
tation of the stautes, an absurd result occurs and hence, 
there is ambiguity. However, it does not follow that impos-
sibility or implementation of the Act is an absurd result. 
In the case of Hernandez v. Frothmiller, 204 P.2d 854, 
68 Ariz 242 (1949), the Arizona Supreme Cou~t said: 
"We recognize the rule that, when giving the 
literal meaning to language of a statute results 
in an absurdity or impossibility, courts will 
under some circumstances alter, mooify, or sup-
ply words in order to give effect ·to the plain 
intention of the lawmaker. This does not mean 
that when language has a plain meaning to which 
effect cannot legally be given, the court will 
try to ciuess what the lawmakers intended." 
(emphasis added). 
It is further suggested by Appellants, that the failure 
to include a "grandfather" clause in the Act was merely an 
7 
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oversight; that the intention of the legislature was to cre-
ate a Board from the masseurs already practicing in the 
state. By asking this Court to superimpose its own section 
in the Act, grandfathering in members of the Board, Appel-
lants are asking the Court to second-guess the legislature. 
In the case of Automobile Drivers and Demonstrators Union 
Local v. Department of Retirement Systems, 529 P.2d 379, 
92 Wash. 2d 415, appeal dismissed, certiorari denied 100 
s.ct. 724, (1978), the Washington Supreme Court stated: 
"This court cannot read into a statute that 
which it may believe the legislature has o-
mitted, be it an intentional or; ·inadvertent 
omission". ' 
rs it not equally probable that the Legislature was aware 
of its actions and intentionally failed to include a "grandfather" 
clause. Again, it is not the duty of this court to second-
guess the Legislature. 
In the case of Department of Labor and Industries v. 
Cook, 269 P.2d 962 (WA 1954) the Washington Supreme Court was 
faced with the problem of deciding whether or not it had the 
authority to alter a statute which when given a strict in-
terpretation caused an illogical result.· - . There was no am-
biguity in the words of the statute. The statute in question 
allowed the Department a right to defend in superior courts 
those board decisions which were favorable to the Department, 
but denied the right to court action upon an adverse decision. 
Speaking of the lack of logic in this situation, the Court 
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stated: 
"But, whether the seeming lack of logic in 
this situation is the product of inadvertence 
or intention, the fact remains that the act 
lacks such a provision. The court cannot read 
into a statute anything which it may conceive 
that the legislature has unintentionally left 
out." I 
I 
It may be true that the failure to provide means to es-
tablish an initial Board is an illogical result. But, the 
logic of the statute is not the question before the Court. 
The Act and the sections within the Act which provide the 
guidelines for the creation of the Board are clear. There 
is but one interpretation that can be applied. The Division 
and the District Court have determined that_ the Board cannot 
be created. Absent ambiguity in the statute, this Court must 
follow suit. The problem presented by this case is best left 
to those who created it, the Legislature. 
II 
THE COURTS DO NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO AND 
SHOULD NOT LEGISLATE A CHANGE TO RECTIFY 
THE PROBLEMS FOUND WITHIN THE ACT. 
As has been suggested, Appellants are urging this Court 
to create a "grandfather clause" to the Act.by allowing 
certain individuals to be licensed without exam. In support 
of his position, counsel cited several cases which he de-
clared support such action. However, as explained in Argu-
ment I, nowhere does Appellant cite authority to support 
the idea of modifying a clear and unambiguous statute. By 
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asking this Court to modify the Act, Appellants are asking 
the Court to cross the barriers of separation of powers and 
legislate a change in the Act. Such action is clearly be-
yond the powers granted the Court. 
Article V, Section 1 of the 1utah Constitution states: j 
I 
The powers of the government of the State 
of Utah shall be divided into three distinct de-
partments, the Legislative, the Executive, and 
the Judicial; and no person char~ed with the ex-
ercise of powers properly belonging to one of 
these departments, shall exercise any functions 
appertaining to either of the others, except in 
the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Utah Supreme Court, ·beginning with cases around 
the turn of the century have been quite conEistent that it 
is not the position of the courts to legislate. The Court in 
Young v. Salt Lake City, 67 P. 1066 (Utah 1902) held: 
The appellant contends that the statute under 
which this proceeding was taken is unconsti-
tutional and void, and that it attempts to 
delegate power to the district court and 
commissioners to legislate, and that the 
power given is a legislative power, and that 
the court cannot be invested with it by the 
legislature, under the constitution. It is 
true that, under the constitution, powers 
belonging to one department of government 
cannot be exercised by others. Courts cannot 
legislate or make laws. (Emphasis_added.) 
Earlier, the court held in Kimball v. City of Grantsville, 
57 P. 1 (Utah 1899): 
Independently of any repugnance between a 
legislative act, and any constitutional 
limitation or restriction, a court has no 
power to arrest its execution, however unwise 
. or unjust, in the opinion of the court, it 
may be, or whatever motives may have led to 
its enactment. 
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Accepting this as sound doctrine, as we safe-
ly may, would not the judicial department it-
self be guilty of transcending its constitu-
tional power were it to inquire into the ex-
pediency, wisdom, or justice of the legislation 
in question in this case? This, in itself, 
would be an abuse, because it would be a usur-
pation of power by one department of the govern-
ment which the people absolutely vested in an-
other. 
Appellants suggest that the principle of "separation of 
powers" is not the issue in this caseo It is suggested that 
creating exceptions to the Act would merely be an extension 
of the Court's proper function, (i.e. , -int~rpreting the statu-
tory law promulgated by the other branch of government.) 
Again; Appellants fail to understand that they are asking 
the Court to do more than interpret the Acto Interpret-
ing the Act leads one to the conclusion that the Board can-
not be createdo The Court interprets ambiguities found with-
in statuteso Here, there are no ambiguitieso How can the 
Court interpret the words of the statute as creating exceptions 
to the Act, which don't exist within the Acto The Courts have 
always embraced this principle. In Travelers Indemnity Com-
pany v. Kowalski, 43 Cal. Rptro 843 (1965) the court stated: 
"We recognize that the statute we are 
reviewing must be given a liberal interpretation. 
Nevertheless, ... this "does not vitiate the 
elementary principle that the judicial function 
is simply to ascertain and declare what is in 
terms or in substance contained in the statute, 
not to insert what has been omitted, or omit what 
. has been inserted." (emphasis added) 
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The Nebraska court stated in City of Grand Island v. 
County of Hall, 242 N.W. 2d 858, 196 Neb. 282 (1976) that: 
"Where the language of a statue is plain and 
unambiguous, no interpretation is needed and 
the court is without authority to change the 
language." [citing State v. Gallegos, 193 Neb. 
651, 228 N.W. 2d 615. iEmphasis added.] 
! 
In Pedroli v; Missouri Pacific Railroad, 524 S.W.2d 882 
(Mo. 1975), the Supreme Court of Missouri, referring to when 
it is and is not appropriate-for the courts to amend a stat-
ute stated: 
"When the language of a statute is unambig-
uous and conveys a plain and definite meaning, 
the courts have no business to look for or to 
impose another meaning [De Poortere v. Commer-
cial Credit Corporation, 500 S.W._2d 724, 727 
(Mo. App. 1973)]. If a statute -is unambigu-
ous, a court should regard it as meaning what it 
says since the legislature is presumed to have 
intended exactly what it states directly." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Once the courts step beyond ascertaining and declaring what 
is in terms or in substance contained in the statute, it ceases 
its interpretation function and begins to usurp the power of the 
legislature. This Court, in Kimball, supra'said: "In such 
case the legislature alone can afford a remedy. The judicial 
department cannot arrogate to itself power:not within its pro-
vince." Even as late as State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 
1977) this Court was standing by that basic premise. With the 
problems within the Act itself, the Legislature has many options 
to solve them. The decision of which option to choose should 
be left to it. 
In Anderson v. I. M. Jameson Corporation, et al, 59 P.2d 
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962, (CA 1936) the California Supreme Court explained that ab-
sent the ambiguity in the statute the courts must refrain 
from correcting the statute even if the consequence would be 
to defeat the object of the Act. The Court stated: 
"It is probably safe to assume that the 
Legislature had in mind [a certain proviso] 
but the difficulty is that they have not ex-
pressed this intent in the language usedo 
This court has no power to rewrite the Section 
so as to make it conform to a presumed inten 
tion which is not expressed. This court is 
limited to interpreting the Section, and such 
interpretation must be based on the language 
used ... 'It is a cardinal rule with the con-
struction of Sections that the intent of the 
legislators should be followed, but this is 
subject to the imperative and paramount rule 
that the court cannot depart from the meaning 
of language which is free from ambiguity, al-
though the consequence would be to def eat the 
object of the Act .. 11 [citing Seaboard Accept-
ance Corp. v. Shay, 214 Cal. 361, 5 P. 2d 882] 
Even though the sustaining of the summary judgment 
order would result in continued delay in the formation of the 
Board, the Court is without authority to depart from the clear and 
unambiguous language of the statute. The Court cannot arrogate 
to itself power not within its province. Interpretation of 
the Act leads to only one conclusion. Implementation· of the 
Act is not possible at the present time. Fu~ther legislative 
action is needed. 
I II. 
THE APPELLANTS' CONTINUED OPERATION 
AS A LEGITIMATE BUSINESS IS NOT IN 
JEOPARDY. 
In their brief, Appellants maintain that the Act 
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pre-empts local regulation of the massage business. Reference is 
made to ordinances passed by Salt Lake County and South Salt 
Lake which Appellants contend unduly restrict their business 
practice. In both instances, the ordinances exempt from li-
censure those masseurs who are licensed by the state. If this 
Court amends the Act, Appellants will no longer be subject to 
restrictions which they feel jeopardize the continued opera-
tion of their business. 
Appellants fail to realize that the exemption granted 
by the ordinances for those licensed by the state simply indi-
cates the intention of the local governing,bodies to regulate 
their business in the event that the state fails to do so. 
Furthermore, the Act does not pre-empt _local regulation. It 
merely provides a system for state licensure and regulation. 
There is no provision in the Act which prohibits counties or 
cities from creating their own regulatory schemes relative to 
the operation of massage business within their respective juris-
dictions. Licensing requirements along with procedures for 
handling disciplinary proceedings is not blanket authority to 
exclusive jurisdictiono Al though, under .. the Act, all masseurs 
in the state must be licensed, nothing prohibits the introduction 
of ordinances which further define the legitimate practice of 
massage in a given jurisdictiono Several professions which 
are licensed by the State are likewise controlled by specific 
ordinances which govern the operations of the professions with-
in a given jurisdiction. 
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Even if the Act did pre-empt local regulation, it 
is of no significance to the issue now before the Court. The 
only issue beofre the Court is whether or not the courts 
have the authority to amend an unambiguous Act in order to al-
low its implementation. The ord~nances of which Appellants 
complain have been duly enacted and fall within the parameters 
of the Court's decisions in Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County 
Commission, 624 P. 2d 1138 (Utah 1981) and Hollingsworth v. 
The City of South Salt Lake, 624 P. 2d 1149 (Utah 1981). They 
do not prohibit the operation of Appellant's legitimate busi-
ness but merely restrict the manner in which it may be car-
ried out. 
Absent the establishment of the Board the Act can 
have no practical effect. Appellants do not run the risk of 
being put out of business or of being criminally prosecuted 
because of the Act. The only result of the Court's decision 
affirming Judge Taylor's order will be to leave the solution 
of the problem to those who created it in the first place, the 
Utah Legislature. 
CONCLUSION 
The language of the statute is clear. The Legisla-
ture requires all to pass an examination. The only waiver 
relates to the educational training required for those having 
five or more years of experience. 
The Legislature did not "grandfather" any indivi-
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duals, and requires that a Board of "licensed" technicians 
act as the Board. This doesn't create ambiguity, but creates 
a non-implementable statute that must be amended by the Legis-
lature, not the Courts. 
As such, this Court is urged to sustain the decision of 
the District Court. 
Dated this 
Jb;--~ day of May, 1982. 
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